Online Appendix

Who Said or What Said?
Estimating Ideological Bias in Views Among Economists

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1. Attrition and sample selection

As discussed in the main text, we exclude from our final sample participants who did not complete the entire survey. Table A3 reports the numbers of people who reached different levels of progress in the survey before withdrawing from the survey. If withdrawal from the survey was non-random across our three groups, our results could potentially suffer from sample selection bias. This could happen, for example, if people who are relatively more ideologically biased are also more likely to withdraw from the survey if they receive statements with no source attribution or less-/non-mainstream source attributions. We perform several tests to examine the possibility of sample selection bias in our results.

First, we estimate a discrete time proportional hazard model (complementary log-log), using a fully non-parametric baseline hazard to examine how survival rate (not quitting the survey) changes as participants progress through the survey and whether it differs for participants randomized into different groups. These results are presented in Figure A1 and each point estimates the rate of withdrawal from the survey at statement j given that it has not occurred before statement j. Our results clearly suggests that the withdrawal rate is almost identical at different stages of the survey for those who are randomized into control group (mainstream source) and treatment 1 (less-/non-mainstream source). This suggests that estimates comparing control group with treatment 1 (which we refer to in the main text as ideological bias) are unlikely to suffer from sample selection due to the sample restriction imposed. This is also consistent with our estimates from models with individual fixed effects discussed in the main text (Table 1, Column 4). These estimates are not affected by sample selection since they are identified by variations in treatment within an individual and across statements, and are identical to estimates from our OLS models.

Results reported in Figure 1 suggest however that those who were randomized into treatment 2 (no source) have a slightly higher withdrawal rate. This could be potentially due to the fact that the absence of a source or authority behind statements that are critical of mainstream economics could make participants more likely to stop responding to the survey. Assuming that those who are relatively more ideologically-biased and less tolerant of alternative views are more likely to withdraw in this situation, this higher withdrawal rate will result in an underestimation of the true difference between treatment 2 and control group (which we refer to in the main text as authority bias). In other words, our estimated effects of treatment 2 could be thought of as conservative estimates or lower-bounds of the true bias.

As our second test, we examine whether the number of mainstream versus less-/non-mainstream sources received by a participant affects the probability of withdrawal. As it was mentioned in the main text, participants who were randomized into control group or treatment 1 for the first statement were re-randomized between these two groups for each subsequent statement. Therefore, as they progress through the survey they will receive some of the statements with mainstream sources and some of the statements with less-/non-mainstream sources. Results from this second test are reported in Table A4. We find that receiving more mainstream or less-/non-mainstream sources reduces the probability of quitting. This is to be expected and consistent with our results in Figure A1 that as participants progress through the survey their probability of completing the entire survey (quitting the survey) increases (decreases). Our estimates in Table A4 clearly suggest, however, that there are no statistically significant differences in reduction in probability of withdrawal between control group and treatment 1. In other words, receiving more mainstream or non-mainstream sources does not make participants to withdraw at a higher rate. Therefore, similar to the first test, these results suggest that our estimated differences between control group and treatment 1 are unlikely to suffer from sample selection.

Alternatively, one could argue that, while people randomized into different groups might have similar withdrawal rates, the amount of cognitive effort participants put in to evaluate statements might be systematically different across groups. While we believe that this is a manifestation of ideological bias, nonetheless we run a test where we take the survey completion time as a proxy for effort invested for cognitive evaluation and examine whether it is different across different groups. These results are reported in Table A5 and suggest that there are no differences in average survey completion time between control group and treatment 1. We find those randomized into treatment 2 on average take less time to complete the survey, but the estimated difference is very small (less than a minute) and is to be expected since people in this group have less text to read given that there are no source attributions provided.

Finally, we examine whether including those who completed part of the survey in our analysis affects our results. While the terms of our ethics approval does not allow us to report these estimates here, our results stay almost identical to those reported in the main text, which is consistent with other tests discussed above.

2. Robustness checks

We perform several additional tests to examine the robustness of our results. First, we estimate a model similar to the one reported in Table 1 in the main text where we estimate average differences in agreement level between different groups using participants' reported confidence level as weights. In other words, we give more (less) weight to evaluations of participants who report more (less) confidence in their assessment. These estimates are reported in Column (1) of Table A6 and are identical to estimates without weights reported in Column (2). This is of course consistent with our results in Table 3, discussed in the main text, that on average there are no differences in the self-reported confidence level between different groups.

As our second robustness check, we examine whether restricting our sample to individuals with different survey completion times will affect our results. One might argue, for example, that our results could be driven by individuals who do not pay much attention to the statements, for instance, and very quickly go through the survey, mainly using sources as the basis for their evaluation. To examine this hypothesis, we estimate average differences in agreement level between different groups using different subsamples based on individual survey completion time. These results are reported in Columns (3) to (6) of Table A6. We find that restricting our sample to individuals who completed the survey in different time frames (5 to 20 minutes, 7 to 20 minutes, 10 to 20 minutes, 10 to 30 minutes) does not affect our estimates and our results stay robust across the board.

As our final robustness check we design a falsification test in which we re-estimate the specifications reported in Table 1 but where we replace our group assignment indicators for each statement with new indicators based on participant's group assignment from her next statement. Results from this falsification test are reported in Table A7 and lend additional support to our randomization and identification strategy. More specifically, since those who are randomized into control group or treatment 1 at the beginning of the survey are re-randomized between these two groups for each subsequent statement, identifying a person's group assignment using her next statement is similar to the outcome that would emerge from a coin flip. Therefore, there should not be any differences in average agreement level between control group and treatment 1 in the falsification test, which is exactly what we find in Table A7. Moreover, since those who are randomly selected into treatment 2 stay in that group for the entire survey, their group assignment measure will not change in the falsification scheme. Therefore, our falsification test should still

produce estimated gaps in agreement level with the control group. However, since the new control group is a random mix of individuals from the actual control group and actual treatment 1, the estimated gaps should be smaller than the ones reported in Table1. Results reported in Table A7 fully support this conclusion.

Altogether, using different robustness tests, we find no evidence that would cast doubt on our survey implementation, identification strategy, or estimated results.

3. Why deception?

While experiments with deception are commonly used in other social sciences such as psychology and political science, economists discourage the use of deception in certain contexts. As Wilson (2014) points out, economists' reluctance, or opposition, to the use of deception is not based on any deontic aversion to dishonesty, but rather due to their concern regarding the potential effect deception might have on participant's psychological reaction to suspected manipulation. This concern usually applies to experiments that involve some type of monetary reward that is supposed to induce incentive in participants.

For example, Cooper (2014) suggests that "the ban on deception stems primarily from the role of economic experiments in testing economic theory. The theoretical predictions in most settings are a function of the objective functions for individual decision makers. A test of these predictions is valid only if the experimenter has control over the incentives of the experimental participants. If participants believe they or others will be paid according to some rule other than what they have been told, control is lost and the test is no longer valid." Similarly, Davis and Holt (1993) argue that "Most economists are very concerned about developing and maintaining a reputation among the students by the induced monetary rewards rather than by psychological reactions to suspected manipulation."

Given this potential distortionary impact deception could have on participants, it is therefore argued by some economists that deception might impose negative externalities on experimenters in general over time by destroying the credibility of all economic experimenters. On the other hand, Cooper (2014) points out that "no one experiment using deception destroys the reputation of a researcher, a laboratory, or the field as a whole […]." Although he points out that "the cumulative effect could be quite severe", he also acknowledges that "there is little evidence of indirect effects akin to the poisoning of the well feared by many experimental economists." In

addition to this argument, we would also like to highlight that this potential cumulative negative effect relies on two important conditions:

(1) The extent to which the same target population will be asked to participate in other experiments that are also likely to suffer from participant's suspicion about deception. As Jamison et al. (2008) point out, "The primary concern with deception is that many experimental laboratories use a common pool of participants. Thus, a public goods problem exists in which experiencing deception in one experiment may cause participants to react differently (and uncertainly) in future games with other researchers." This concern does not seem to apply to our study since economists are rarely the participants of experimental studies.

(2) The extent to which future experiments are similar to the previous experiment(s) with deception that participants were exposed to. Results from Brock and Becker (1966) and Cook et al. (1970) suggest that past experiments with deception do not affect the behaviour of participants in future experiments when the experiments are dissimilar.

Nevertheless, one could argue that there might be situations in which the same target population (i.e. economists) is asked to participate in a study that does not involve deception and simply tries to evaluate economist's opinions and views. We argue however that under such scenario our experiment could affect the behaviour of participants in ways that could be only described as positive. More specifically, if we find that using altered sources with different views will induce ideological bias in responses, this could encourage people to avoid judgment based on sources and pay more attention to the content of an argument or idea when expressing their opinions on a subject. This is especially important given the fact that in many cases exhibited individual bias could be unconscious or unintentional, and gaining knowledge about this behaviour is potentially extremely valuable. Bertrand and Duflo (2017) highlight the importance of implicit bias by pointing out that "modern social psychologists believe that attitudes can occur in implicit modes and that people can behave in ways that are unrelated or even sometimes opposed to their explicit views or self-interests." We believe finding out about our own potential biases is certainly a positive outcome for economists who strive to be objective and ideology-free. This also seems to be consistent with the standard most participants in our study hold themselves to.[1]

[1] At the end of our survey, we ask our participants to answer a series of questions to identify their political typology. One of these questions is however not related to political typology and is included to find out how our participants think an argument should be evaluated. Around 82% of participants in our survey report that "a claim or argument

In light of these arguments, we suggest that categorical rejection of applying deception in experiments is an extreme position that is not supported by theory or empirical evidence. As Cooper (2014), the Editor-in-Chief for *Experimental Economics* puts it "only an extremist would claim that experimenters (or economists in general) should never use deception." He points out that "Labor economics, for example, has benefited from a long series of field experiments on discrimination that use deception." In essence, our study is not any different from these correspondence studies that are well-accepted in economics, evident by their publication in top economic journals (See Bertrand and Duflo (2017) and Riach and Rich (2002) for a review. Also see Currie et al. (2014) as another example). Given the important methodological challenges and limitations in measuring the existence of discrimination, Guryan and Charles (2013) argue that "correspondence studies represent a significant methodological advance."

Similar to these correspondence studies, unless we use a treatment that is unknown to participants (i.e. alteration of the true source of a statement), we cannot provide a convincing answer to the question we are interested in, especially given the fact that such biases are often exhibited in unconscious or unintentional ways. Clearly, if participants are aware of the true purpose of the study, which is examining whether their assessment of different statements is influenced by ideologically-different sources, this will affect how they express their views and renders our results practically useless. In our opinion, the main difference between our study and the correspondence studies is that our target population are economists as opposed to potential employers, or doctors in the case of Currie et al. (2014). One could even argue that our study lacks some of the potential disadvantages that could be associated with correspondence or audit studies. For example, flooding the market with fictitious resumes could negatively affect the chances of some real candidates for being reasonably evaluated by employers. Similarly, sending fake patients to hospitals (See Currie et al. 2014) clearly consumes public resources and affects real patients.

To summarize, based on arguments provided above, we believe the application of deception in our study is not associated with the potential negative outcomes feared by some

should be rejected only on the basis of the substance of the argument itself." Around 18% of participants report that "a claim or argument should be rejected based on what we know about the views of the author or the person presenting the argument as well as the substance of the argument." There exists only a tiny minority (around 0.5%) who report "a claim or argument should be rejected based on what we know about the views of the author or the person presenting the argument."

economists. Cooper (2014) suggests the following four rules as reasonable guidelines for when deception is allowable in experiments:

1. The deception does not harm subjects beyond what is typical for an economic experiment without deception.
2. The study would be prohibitively difficult to conduct without deception.
3. Subjects are adequately debriefed after the fact about the presence of deception.
4. The value of the study is sufficiently high to merit the potential costs associated with the use of deception.

We believe our discussion above clearly suggests that our experiment meets all these four criteria.

4. Reference

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5. Appendix tables and figures

Figure A1: Hazard function by source assignment – Cloglog model



Figure A2: OLS estimates of gender differences in agreement level between control and treatment groups – By statement



Note: Agreement levels is z-normalized for each statement. Control variables include: PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area. Both 90% and 95% confidence intervals are displayed for each estimate. The two horizontal lines on each confidence interval band represent where the 90% confidence interval ends.
First (second) listed source for each statement is the actual (altered) source.

Figure A3: Distribution of responses by institute of affiliation - US



Figure A4: Distribution of responses by institute of affiliation - Canada



Figure A5: Distribution of responses by institute of affiliation – UK



Figure A6: Probability of Different Confidence Levels – By Statement

Note: confidence level with evaluation is coded on a scale from 1 (least confident) to 5 (most confident).

Table A1: Summary Statistics (All reported numbers are in percentages)

	Overall	Control	Treatment 1	Treatment 2
Current Country where job is located				
Australia	4.45	3.83	4.42	5.10
Austria	1.48	1.44	1.61	1.42
Brazil	1.94	1.91	1.34	2.49
Canada	11.70	11.00	11.50	12.50
France	8.74	8.49	9.92	7.95
Germany	3.92	3.83	3.62	4.27
Ireland	0.66	0.72	0.67	0.59
Italy	8.21	8.37	7.51	8.66
Japan	2.23	2.15	2.28	2.25
Netherlands	2.52	2.15	2.68	2.73
New Zealand	2.23	2.03	2.41	2.25
Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden)	6.02	6.10	5.76	6.17
South Africa	1.32	1.08	1.47	1.42
Switzerland	1.57	1.67	1.74	1.30
United Kingdom	5.61	5.62	6.03	5.22
United States	37.40	39.60	37.00	35.70
Gender:				
Female	21.90	22.20	20.50	22.70
Age:				
18 to 25	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.24
26 to 30	2.14	1.67	2.28	2.49
31 to 35	10.20	10.50	10.60	9.61
36 to 40	11.90	11.20	10.60	13.60
41 to 45	11.40	10.90	11.10	12.20
46 to 50	10.20	11.60	8.71	10.20
51 to 55	10.80	11.50	10.50	10.40
56 to 60	9.81	8.97	11.50	9.13
61 to 65	9.77	9.69	9.52	10.10
66 to 70	7.71	8.25	8.04	6.88
71 to 75	5.28	5.02	6.30	4.63
76+	1.65	1.44	1.88	1.66
Not Reported	8.49	8.37	8.98	8.19
Country/Region of Birth:				
United States	26.80	28.10	25.70	26.60
Canada	7.96	7.42	8.58	7.95
Africa	2.02	2.27	1.74	2.02
Asia	6.56	6.58	6.43	6.64
Central America (including Mexico)	0.37	0.48	0.67	0.00
South America	3.26	3.47	3.08	3.20
Eastern Europe	2.23	2.39	1.74	2.49
Europe 1 (France, Belgium)	8.70	7.89	9.79	8.54
Europe 2 (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg)	9.24	8.25	9.52	9.96
Europe 3 (Italy, Spain, Portugal)	10.40	9.69	9.92	11.50
Europe 4 (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden)	4.25	4.19	4.42	4.15
Europe 5 (UK, Ireland)	4.78	4.78	5.09	4.51
Europe 6 (Rest of Europe)	0.78	0.72	0.94	0.71
Middle East	1.32	1.08	1.21	1.66
Oceania	2.56	2.63	2.55	2.49
The Caribbean	0.21	0.24	0.27	0.12
Not Reported	8.54	9.81	8.31	7.47

Sample Size	2425	836	746	843

Table A1 (continued 1): Summary Statistics

	Overall	**Control**	**Treatment 1**	**Treatment 2**
English Proficiency:				
Native speaker	46.80	47.20	47.30	46.00
Advanced	39.90	39.40	41.00	39.40
Early advanced	6.64	6.46	5.90	7.47
Intermediate	5.32	5.26	5.23	5.46
Early intermediate	1.32	1.67	0.54	1.66
Political Orientation (on a scale from -10 to 10)				
Far Left (-10 to -7)	18.90	18.80	17.80	20.00
Left (-6 to -2)	40.90	39.70	43.40	40.00
Centre (-1 to 1)	19.80	21.30	18.20	19.80
Right (2 to 6)	15.20	15.30	15.40	14.80
Far Right (7 to 10)	4.95	4.90	4.83	5.10
Current Status:				
Assistant professor	18.40	17.70	18.50	19.00
Associate professor	22.10	20.70	21.20	24.30
Full professor, Professor emeritus	43.00	43.30	44.20	41.60
Postdoctoral fellow, Visiting scholar	2.72	3.59	2.41	2.14
Instructor (tenure-track or not tenure-track)	6.43	6.22	6.97	6.17
Employee of a government agency or institution	4.12	4.55	3.89	3.91
Employee of an independent research institution or think tank	2.31	2.99	2.28	1.66
Other	0.91	0.96	0.54	1.19
Department of Affiliation:				
Economics	62.90	61.40	63.40	64.10
Economics, Business, Management	8.74	9.69	7.51	8.90
Business, Management	5.03	4.55	5.63	4.98
Public policy	2.80	2.99	2.68	2.73
Industrial relations	0.21	0.60	0.00	0.00
Government agency or institution	2.43	2.15	2.28	2.85
Independent research institution or think tank	1.40	1.56	1.61	1.07
Other	4.54	3.95	4.83	4.86
Research Area:				
Teaching	4.16	3.71	4.69	4.15
History of Thought, Methodology, Heterodox Approaches	5.98	5.86	5.90	6.17
Mathematical and Quantitative Methods	6.72	6.94	7.24	6.05
Microeconomics	8.82	8.01	9.38	9.13
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics	11.40	11.60	11.40	11.30
International Economics	6.60	6.46	6.30	7.00
Financial Economics	4.04	4.31	4.56	3.32
Public Economics	7.09	6.46	7.37	7.47
Health, Education, and Welfare	5.65	5.74	4.69	6.41
Labor and Demographic Economics	10.20	11.60	9.38	9.49
Law and Economics	1.40	2.15	1.07	0.95
Industrial Organization	4.58	4.43	4.29	4.98
Business Administration, Marketing, Accounting	2.97	3.35	3.08	2.49
Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change	8.37	8.37	8.58	8.19
Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics	7.79	7.30	8.04	8.07
Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics	2.43	2.15	2.68	2.49
Cultural Economics, Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology	0.54	0.48	0.40	0.71
Other	1.24	1.08	0.94	1.66
Sample Size	2425	836	746	843

Table A1 (continued 2): Summary Statistics

	Overall	Control	Treatment 1	Treatment 2
PhD Completion Year:				
1951 to 1955	0.08	0.00	0.00	0.24
1956 to 1960	0.12	0.12	0.00	0.24
1961 to 1965	0.95	0.84	0.80	1.19
1966 to 1970	1.81	2.27	1.88	1.30
1971 to 1975	4.04	3.95	5.09	3.20
1976 to 1980	5.69	5.50	5.23	6.29
1981 to 1985	7.22	8.13	7.10	6.41
1986 to 1990	8.58	7.42	10.20	8.30
1991 to 1995	10.30	11.60	10.10	9.13
1996 to 2000	10.40	12.10	8.98	9.85
2001 to 2005	10.80	9.93	11.30	11.40
2006 to 2010	13.30	12.10	12.70	14.90
2011 to 2017	18.30	18.30	18.10	18.50
Expected in the future	0.95	1.08	0.67	1.07
No PhD Degree	7.46	6.58	7.91	7.95
Country/Region Completed PhD:				
United States	45.00	48.00	43.00	43.80
Canada	6.31	5.98	5.90	7.00
Africa	0.99	1.08	0.94	0.95
Asia	1.32	1.32	1.74	0.95
Central America (including Mexico)	0.04	0.12	0.00	0.00
South America	1.20	1.20	1.07	1.30
Eastern Europe	0.04	0.12	0.00	0.00
Europe 1 (France, Belgium)	9.15	8.37	10.10	9.13
Europe 2 (Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg)	8.49	7.18	9.79	8.66
Europe 3 (Italy, Spain, Portugal)	5.98	6.94	4.83	6.05
Europe 4 (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden)	4.16	4.43	4.56	3.56
Europe 5 (UK, Ireland)	7.13	6.34	7.24	7.83
Europe 6 (Rest of Europe)	0.08	0.00	0.13	0.12
Oceania	2.43	1.91	2.68	2.73
The Caribbean	0.04	0.00	0.13	0.00
Other	0.12	0.36	0.00	0.00
Not Applicable	7.46	6.58	7.91	7.95
Undergraduate Major:				
Economics	63.10	62.70	62.30	64.20
Other Social Sciences (Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology)	1.20	0.96	0.94	1.66
Business, Management	5.57	6.22	5.36	5.10
Biology, Chemistry, Physics	2.39	2.87	2.01	2.25
Computer Science, Engineering	2.68	2.51	2.68	2.85
Earth and space sciences, Geography	1.86	2.03	2.41	1.19
History, Language and literature	1.86	1.91	2.14	1.54
Law	0.33	0.48	0.13	0.36
Mathematics, Statistics	8.25	7.30	8.71	8.78
Medicine	0.08	0.00	0.13	0.12
Performing arts, Visual arts	0.04	0.12	0.00	0.00
Philosophy, Political Science	3.96	4.31	3.35	4.15
Agricultural Sciences	1.48	1.32	1.47	1.66
Other	0.50	0.60	0.54	0.36
Not Reported	6.72	6.70	7.77	5.81
Sample Size	2425	836	746	843

Table A2: Estimates of Control Variables – Agreement Level OLS Regression

Variable	(1)	(2)	Variable	(1)	(2)
Female	0.096***	0.099***	Ireland	-0.035	-0.039
	(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.063)	(0.066)
PhD: 1951-1955	0.294	0.365	Italy	0.248***	0.237***
	(0.246)	(0.241)		(0.024)	(0.040)
PhD: 1956-1960	0.461***	0.427***	Japan	0.047	-0.017
	(0.113)	(0.121)		(0.034)	(0.053)
PhD: 1966-1970	-0.152**	-0.241***	Netherlands	0.034	0.011
	(0.061)	(0.064)		(0.035)	(0.044)
PhD: 1971-1975	-0.177***	-0.259***	New Zealand	-0.031	-0.008
	(0.053)	(0.058)		(0.038)	(0.041)
PhD: 1976-1980	-0.127**	-0.188***	South Africa	0.354***	0.270***
	(0.052)	(0.057)		(0.045)	(0.070)
PhD: 1981-1985	-0.105**	-0.140**	Switzerland	0.072	0.080
	(0.051)	(0.058)		(0.044)	(0.050)
PhD: 1986-1990	-0.089*	-0.094	UK	0.061**	0.030
	(0.050)	(0.057)		(0.026)	(0.032)
PhD: 1991-1995	-0.098*	-0.084	US	-0.021	0.053**
	(0.050)	(0.058)		(0.018)	(0.027)
PhD: 1996-2000	-0.114**	-0.091	**Research**		
	(0.050)	(0.058)	Teaching	-0.226***	-0.202***
PhD: 2001-2005	-0.157***	-0.108*		(0.033)	(0.033)
	(0.050)	(0.059)	Math & Quant.	-0.347***	-0.332***
PhD: 2006-2010	-0.190***	-0.105*		(0.028)	(0.028)
	(0.051)	(0.059)	Micro	-0.411***	-0.389***
PhD: 2011-2017	-0.168***	-0.115*		(0.027)	(0.027)
	(0.051)	(0.060)	Macro	-0.356***	-0.337***
No PhD Yet	-0.102	-0.074		(0.026)	(0.026)
	(0.074)	(0.080)	International Econ	-0.325***	-0.305***
No PhD	-0.118**	-0.082		(0.028)	(0.028)
	(0.052)	(0.065)	Financial Econ	-0.367***	-0.342***
Associate Prof	-0.003	-0.007		(0.032)	(0.033)
	(0.019)	(0.020)	Public Econ	-0.347***	-0.336***
Full/Emeritus Prof	-0.046**	-0.049**		(0.029)	(0.029)
	(0.020)	(0.021)	Health, Education	-0.247***	-0.231***
Post Doc/Visiting	0.133***	0.117***	Welfare	(0.029)	(0.030)
	(0.032)	(0.034)	Labour	-0.264***	-0.252***
Instructor	-0.071***	-0.085***		(0.026)	(0.026)
	(0.026)	(0.026)	Law & Econ	-0.249***	-0.255***
Government Emp.	0.053*	0.090***		(0.052)	(0.053)
	(0.028)	(0.034)	IO	-0.334***	-0.329***
Independent Inst.	0.016	0.034		(0.031)	(0.031)
	(0.037)	(0.044)	Business administration	-0.074**	-0.071*
Status: Other	0.106*	0.120**	Marketing, Accounting	(0.037)	(0.038)
	(0.057)	(0.058)	Development	-0.183***	-0.186***
Austria	0.025	0.046		(0.027)	(0.027)
	(0.045)	(0.055)	Environmental	-0.222***	-0.215***
Brazil	0.148***	0.086	Natural Resource Econ	(0.027)	(0.028)
	(0.042)	(0.077)	Urban Econ.	-0.252***	-0.252***
Canada	0.011	0.061*		(0.038)	(0.039)
	(0.021)	(0.031)	Economic Socio/Anth.	0.024	0.023
France	0.251***	0.067		(0.072)	(0.073)
	(0.023)	(0.044)	Other	0.026	-0.012
Germany	0.111***	0.106**		(0.047)	(0.048)
	(0.030)	(0.043)			

Table A2 (Continued): Estimates of Control Variables – Agreement Level OLS Regression

	(2)		(2)		(2)
Age		Italy, Spain, Portugal	-0.031	**Country PhD**	
26-30	-0.230***		(0.039)	US	-0.036
	(0.086)	Scandinavia	-0.006		(0.026)
31-35	-0.146*		(0.045)	Africa	0.063
	(0.080)	UK, Ireland	0.124***		(0.079)
36-40	-0.213***		(0.034)	Asia	-0.058
	(0.079)	Rest of Europe	0.152**		(0.062)
41-45	-0.192**		(0.064)	Central America	-0.811**
	(0.078)	Middle East	0.187***		(0.388)
46-50	-0.133*		(0.052)	South America	0.291***
	(0.078)	Oceania	-0.024		(0.084)
51-55	-0.140*		(0.046)	Eastern Europe	-0.205
	(0.078)	The Caribbean	0.267**		(0.261)
56-60	-0.137*		(0.114)	France, Belgium	0.157***
	(0.078)	Not Reported	-0.049		(0.041)
61-65	-0.063		(0.033)	Germany, Austria, Switz.	0.071*
	(0.077)	**English Proficiency**		Netherlands, Luxemb.	(0.041)
66-70	-0.025	Advanced	-0.004	Italy, Spain, Portugal	0.128***
	(0.077)		(0.022)		(0.038)
71-75	0.016	Early Advanced	0.005	Scandinavia	0.092**
	(0.078)		(0.030)		(0.044)
76+	-0.078	Intermediate	0.087***	UK, Ireland	0.069**
	(0.083)		(0.032)		(0.033)
Not Reported	-0.102	Early Intermediate	-0.105*	Rest of Europe	-0.466***
	(0.079)		(0.053)		(0.153)
Country of Birth		**Department of Affiliation**		Oceania	0.027
US	0.012	Business, Econ, Manag.	0.069***		(0.047)
	(0.027)		(0.019)	The Caribbean	-0.744**
Africa	0.151***	Business, Management	0.040*		(0.372)
	(0.053)		(0.024)	Other	-0.076
Asia	0.159***	Public Policy	0.156***		(0.122)
	(0.036)		(0.032)		
Central America	0.011	Industrial Relations	0.318***		
	(0.101)		(0.118)		
South America	-0.061	Government	-0.060		
	(0.048)		(0.042)		
Eastern Europe	-0.028	Independent Institution	0.017		
	(0.045)		(0.056)		
France, Belgium	0.132***	Other	0.074***		
	(0.040)		(0.025)		
Germany, Austria, Nether.	-0.001	Not Reported	0.006		
Switz., Luxemb.	(0.037)		(0.018)		
Number of Observations	36375		36375		36375

Note: Reported estimates are estimated coefficients of control variables from regression specifications reported in Table 1 in the main text. Column (1) reports estimates from a model with more limited control variables (gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area) while Column (2) reports estimates from a model with more control variables (those previously listed as well as age cohort, country/region of birth, English proficiency, department of affiliation, country where PhD was completed). The dependent variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). It is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Omitted categories are: PhD: 1961-1965; Status: Assistant Professor; Current Country: Canada; Research Area: History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches; Age: 18-25; Country of Birth: Canada; English Proficiency: Native Speaker; Department of Affiliation: Economics; Country PhD: Canada; Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Table A3: Number of people quitting at different stages of the survey - By group assignment

	Short Questionnaire	Long Questionnaire	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	Total
All	237	217	75	40	53	24	73	18	28	27	10	9	11	24	7	10	2425	3288
Mainstream Source	73	64	21	12	7	8	23	5	8	10	6	2	2	6	0	3	843	1093
Less-/Non-mainstream	105	66	19	9	14	5	23	5	5	7	3	3	4	5	1	4	836	1114
No Source	59	87	35	19	32	11	27	8	15	10	1	4	5	13	6	3	746	1081

Note: People randomized into Control Group (mainstream source) or Treatment 1 (less-/non-mainstream source) at the beginning of the survey do not remain there for the entire survey and could change group for each subsequent statement. At the beginning of the survey each participant has a one-third probability to get randomized into Control Group, Treatment 1 or Treatment 2. Those who are randomized into Treatment 2 (no source) remain there for the entire survey. Those who are randomized into Control Group or Treatment 1 for the first statement will face a 50% chance to stay in their initially assigned group or move to the other one for each subsequent statement. Our classification of Mainstream and Less-/Non-mainstream above is based on the initial assignment. Short questionnaire refers to the first questionnaire page in the survey where participants indicate their country, institution of affiliation, and whether they are a student or not. Long questionnaire refers to the second questionnaire page where participants provide more background information such as gender, age, PhD cohort, area of research, undergraduate major, political orientation, etc.

Table A4: The effect of number of mainstream/non-mainstream sources received on the probability of not completing the survey – Marginal effects from probit model

	Without Control	With Control
Regression 1: Number of Mainstream Sources	-0.022***	-0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
Regression 2: Number of Non-Mainstream Sources	-0.026***	-0.020***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
P-value for the null hypothesis of equality	0.383	0.418
Number of observations	1899	1899

Notes: Those who are randomized into Treatment 2 (no source) are excluded from the regression above since they receive all statements with no source attribution. The unit of observation is a participant. The dependent variable is equal to one if survey was completed by a participant and zero otherwise. Controls include: gender, PhD cohort (15 categories), Current Status (8 categories), Country (19 categories), Research Area (18 categories).

Table A5: Average difference in survey completion time (effort invested in cognitive evaluation) between control and treatment groups

	Without Control	With Control
	(1)	(2)
Treatment 1	-0.006	0.002
Non-/Less-Mainstream Source	(0.061)	(0.059)
Treatment 2	-0.742***	-0.721***
No Source	(0.061)	(0.060)
Constant	9.953***	10.61***
	(0.0433)	(0.270)
Number of observations	33465	33465

Note: Omitted category is Control Group (mainstream source). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of minutes taken to complete the survey. The analysis sample includes all participants who completed the survey, excluding outliers (those who took more than one hour to complete the survey). The outliers are only 2% of our sample. The average (median) completion time for this sample is 10.7 (8.7) minutes. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Control variables include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area.

Table A6: Robustness

	Weighted	Not Weighted	5 to 20 minutes	7 to 20 minutes	10 to 20 minutes	10 to 30 minutes
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment 1	-0.289***	-0.262***	-0.275***	-0.260***	-0.269***	-0.253***
Non-/Less-Mainstream Source	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Treatment 2	-0.448***	-0.405***	-0.395***	-0.385***	-0.394***	-0.381***
No Source	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.027)
Number of observations	36088	36088	28425	19995	11430	12390

Note: Omitted category is Control Group (i.e. mainstream source). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The average agreement level in our sample is 3.35 with standard deviation of 1.185. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. All regressions include the following controls variables: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area.

Column (1) reports estimates from a model where we use reported confidence level as weights in our regression. Column (2) reports results from a similar model but without weights for comparison. Column (3) to (6) are estimates from models where our sample is constrained to participants who completed the survey in 5 to 20 minutes, 7 to 20 minutes, 10 to 20 minutes, and 10 to 30 minutes, respectively.

Table A7: Falsification test – OLS estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Treatment 1	-0.009	0.000	-0.004
Non-/Less-Mainstream Source	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Treatment 2	-0.287***	-0.272***	-0.276***
No Source	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Controls	No	**Yes**	No
More Control	No	No	**Yes**
Number of observations	36375	36375	36375

Note: Omitted category is Control Group (i.e. mainstream source). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The average agreement level in our sample is 3.35 with standard deviation of 1.185. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%. Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, research area. More Controls include all the previously listed variables as well as age cohort, country/region of birth, English proficiency, department of affiliation, country where PhD was completed.

For falsification test, a person's group assignment for a statement is not her actual group assignment but rather her group assignment from next statement. Keep in mind that this does not affect those who are randomized into Treatment 2 at the beginning of the survey because they remain in that group for the entire survey.

Table A8: List of Statements and Sources Used in the Survey

Statement 1:

"When we expect redistributive effects to even out in the long run, so that everyone eventually comes out ahead, we are more likely to overlook reshufflings of income. That is a key reason why we believe that technological progress should run its course, despite its short-run destructive effects on some. When, on the other hand, the forces of trade repeatedly hit the same people – less educated, blue-collar workers – we may feel less sanguine about globalization. Too many economists are tone-deaf to such distinctions. They are prone to attribute concerns about globalization to crass protectionist motives or ignorance, even when there are genuine ethical issues at stake."

Real Source: *By Dani Rodrik, professor of international political economy at Harvard University and the author of The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (2012).*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Paul Krugman, professor of economics at Princeton University, the 2008 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, and the author of The Accidental Theorist and Other Dispatches from the Dismal Science (1999).*

Statement 2:

"A realistic view of intellectual monopoly [e.g. patent, copyright] is that it is a disease rather than a cure. It arises not from a principled effort to increase innovation, but from an evil combination of medieval institutions – guilds, royal licenses, trade restrictions – and the rent-seeking behaviour of would be monopolists seeking to fatten their purse at the expense of public prosperity."

Real Source: *By David Levine, professor of economics at Washington University in St. Louis and the author of Against Intellectual Monopoly (2008).*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Richard Wolff, professor of economics emeritus at the university of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the author of Rethinking Marxism (1985).*

Statement 3:

"It is only in combination with particular, non-rational impulses that reason can determine what to do…"

Real Source: *Friedrich von Hayek (1899-1992), professor of economics at University of Chicago and London School of Economics, and the 1974 recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics.*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *Sigmund Freud (1856-1939), the founder of psychoanalysis and the author of the book Civilization and Its Discontents (1929).*

Statement 4:

"The very wealthy have little need for state-provided education or health care; they have every reason to support cuts in Medicare and to fight any increase in taxes. They have even less reason to support health insurance for everyone, or to worry about the low quality of public schools that plagues much of the country. They will oppose any regulation of banks that restricts profits, even if it helps those who cannot cover their mortgages or protects the public against predatory lending, deceptive advertising, or even a repetition of the financial crash."

Real Source: *By Angus Deaton, professor of economics at Princeton University, the 2015 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics, and the author of The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality (2013).*
Altered Source Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Thomas Piketty, professor of economics at the Paris School of Economics and the author of capital in the twenty-first century (2013).*

Table A8 (continued 1): List of Statements and Sources Used in the Survey

Statement 5:

"Unlike most other science and social science disciplines, economics has made little progress in closing its gender gap over the last several decades. Given the field's prominence in determining public policy, this is a serious issue. Whether explicit or more subtle, intentional or not, the hurdles that women face in economics are very real."

Real Source: *By Carmen Reinhart, Professor of the International Financial System at Harvard Kennedy School and the author of This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2011)"*
Altered Source (Non-Mainstream): *By Diane Elson, British Economist and Sociologist, Professor Emerita at the University of Essex, and the author of Male bias in the development process (1995).*

Note: The pilot version of the survey which was run in Australia had a different statement in place of the one above. Based on some useful feedback we received from participants, we decided to provide a statement that addresses gender issues in economics. Since we already had a Smith/Marx pair (Statement 13), we decided to replace the following quote used in our pilot version with the one provided above.

"Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all."

Real Source: *Adam Smith*
Altered Source (**Less-/non-Mainstream*****):*** *Karl Marx*

Statement 6:

Economic discourse of any sort - verbal, mathematical, econometric-is rhetoric; that is, an effort to persuade. None of these discursive forms should necessarily be privileged over the others unless it is agreed by the community of scholars to be more compelling. Only when economists move away from the pursuit of universal knowledge of 'the economy' and towards an acceptance of the necessity of vision and the historical and spatial contingency of knowledge will the concern over ideological 'bias' begin to fade. Such a turn would have important implications for economic method as well, as knowledge claims would increasingly find support, not in models of constrained optimization, but with such techniques as case studies and historical analyses of social institutions and politics. Increasing reliance of economics on mathematics and statistics has not freed the discipline from ideological bias, it has simply made it easier to disregard.

Real Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By William Milberg, dean and professor of economics at the New School for Social Research and the author of The Crisis of Vision in Modern Economic Thought (1996).*
Altered Source: *By Ronald Coase (1910-2013), professor of economics at the University of Chicago Law School and the 1991 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics.*

Statement 7:

"Academic economists, from their very open-mindedness, are apt to be carried off, unawares, by the bias of the community in which they live. Economists whose social world is Wall Street are very apt to take the Wall Street point of view, while economists at state universities situated in farming districts are apt to be partisans of the agricultural interests".

Real Source: *By Irving Fisher (1867-1947), professor of political economy at Yale University.*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By John Kenneth Galbraith (1908-2006), professor of economics at Harvard University and the author of The New Industrial State (1947).*

Table A8 (continued 2): List of Statements and Sources Used in the Survey

Statement 8:

"The market economy has depended for its own working not only on maximizing profits but also on many other activities, such as maintaining public security and supplying public services—some of which have taken people well beyond an economy driven only by profit. The creditable performance of the so-called capitalist system, when things moved forward, drew on a combination of institutions that went much beyond relying only on a profit-maximizing market economy and on personal entitlements confined to private ownership."

Real Source: *By Amartya Sen, professor of economics and philosophy at Harvard University and the author of Development as Freedom (1999).*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Michael Sandel, American political philosopher and professor of government at Harvard University, and the author of What Money Can't Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (2012).*

Statement 9:

"The laws of property have made property of things which never ought to be property, and absolute property where only a qualified property ought to exist. They have not held the balance fairly between human beings, but have heaped impediments upon some, to give advantage to others; they have purposely fostered inequalities, and prevented all from starting fair in the race."

Real Source: *By John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), an English philosopher, political economist, and the author of On Liberty (1859).*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Friedrich Engels (1820-1895), a German philosopher and the co-author of The Communist Manifesto (1848).*

Statement 10:

"Sharp increases in unemployment beyond the business cycle—one in six American men between 25 and 54 are likely to be out of work even after the U.S. economy recovers—along with dramatic rises in the share of income going to the top 1 and even the top .01 per cent of the population and declining social mobility do raise serious questions about the fairness of capitalism..."

Real Source: *By Larry Summers, professor of economics and president emeritus at Harvard University.*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Yanis Varoufakis, Greek economist who also served as the Greek Minister of Finance (from January to July 2015, when he resigned), and the author of And the Weak Suffer What They Must? Europe's crisis, America's economic future*

Statement 11:

"It is a great fault of symbolic pseudo-mathematical methods of formalizing a system of economic analysis…that they expressly assume strict independence between the factors involved and lose all their cogency and authority if this hypothesis is disallowed; … Too large a proportion of recent mathematical economics are mere concoctions, as imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest upon, which allow the author to lose sight of the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and unhelpful symbols."

Real Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Joh Maynard Keynes (1883-1946), professor of economics at Cambridge and the author of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936).*
Altered Source: *By Kenneth Arrow, professor of economics at Stanford University and the 1972 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics.*

Table A8 (continued 3): List of Statements and Sources Used in the Survey

Statement 12:

"From this failure to expunge the microeconomic foundations of neoclassical economics from post-Great Depression theory arose the "microfoundations of macroeconomics" debate, which ultimately led to a model in which the economy is viewed as a single utility-maximizing individual blessed with perfect knowledge of the future. Fortunately, behavioral economics provides the beginnings of an alternative vision of how individuals operate in a market environment, while multi-agent modelling and network theory give us foundations for understanding group dynamics in a complex society. […] These approaches should replace neoclassical microeconomics completely."

Real Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Steve Keen, post-Keynesian professor of economics at Kingstone University (UK) and the author of Debunking economics: the naked emperor dethroned? (2011).*
Altered Source: *By Paul Romer, professor of economics at the New York University and the author of The Troubles with Macroeconomics (forthcoming in the American Economic Review).*

Statement 13:

"In the progress of the division of labour, the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labour, that is, of the great body of people, comes to be confined to a few very simple operations, frequently one or two. But the understandings of the greater part of men are necessarily formed by their ordinary employments. The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects too are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become."

Real Source: *By Adam Smith.*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Karl Marx*

Statement 14:

"For four decades, since my time as a graduate student, I have been preoccupied by the kinds of stories about the myriad ways in which people depart from the fictional creatures that populate economic models […]. Compared to this fictional world of Econs, Humans do a lot of misbehaving, and that means that economic models make a lot of bad predictions, predictions that can have much more serious consequences than upsetting a group of students. Virtually no economists saw the financial crisis of 2007–08 coming, and worse, many thought that both the crash and its aftermath were things that simply could not happen."

Real Source: *By Richard Thaler, professor of behavioural science and economics at University of Chicago Booth School of Business and the author of Misbehaving: The Making of Behavioural Economics (2015)..*
Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): *By Gerd Gigerenzer, Director at the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, former professor of psychology at the University of Chicago, and the author of Gut feelings: The intelligence of the unconscious (2007).*

Table A8 (continued 4): List of Statements and Sources Used in the Survey

Statement 15:

"There are powerful forces having to do with the sociology of the profession and the socialization process that tend to push economists to think alike. Most economists start graduate school not having spent much time thinking about social problems or having studied much else besides math and economics. The incentive and hierarchy systems tend to reward those with the technical skills rather than interesting questions or research agendas. An in-group versus out-group mentality develops rather early on that pits economists against other social scientists. […] [E]conomists tend to look down on other social scientists, as those distant, less competent cousins who may ask interesting questions sometimes but never get the answers right. Or, if their answers are right, they are so not for the methodologically correct reasons. Even economists who come from different intellectual traditions are typically treated as "not real economists" or "not serious economists."

Real Source: *By Dani Rodrik, professor of international political economy at Harvard University and the author of The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy (2012)..*

Altered Source (Less-/non-Mainstream): By Anwar Shaikh, professor of economics at the New School for Social Research (New York) and the author of Capitalism: Competition, conflict, Crises (2016).

Note: For each pair of sources we have identified a source as less-mainstream or non-mainstream. Of course, in economics the notions of mainstream and non-mainstream have changed a lot over time. Similar to many other classifications, this is just an attempt to summarize a complex notion and provide an easy-to-understand relative comparison, even though we believe these differences are more appropriately understood as an spectrum rather than a black and white distinction. For the lack of better classifications, therefore, we categorize our sources into these two groups to clearly summarize and represent the relative ideological distance between them to the reader. Of course, it is well understood that this classification does not readily apply to some sources, such as older sources (e.g. Karl Marx or Sigmund Freud) or sources from other disciplines (e.g. Michael Sandel) in the same way it applies to others. However, to remain consistent and avoid confusion for the reader, we stick to the same naming convention for all sources. For example, by using these terms for sources such as Marx or Freud, we intend to highlight that the views they held would have been considered non-mainstream today. Similarly, in cases where both sources might be considered mainstream (e.g. Rodrick Vs. Krugman, or Deaton Vs. Piketty), our use of these terms is intended to be relative rather than absolute.

Table A9: Political typology statements

A. Government regulation of business is necessary to protect the public interest
B. Government regulation of business usually does more harm than good
A. Most people who want to get ahead can make it if they're willing to work hard
B. Hard work and determination are no guarantee of success for most people
A. Discrimination is the main reason why disadvantaged people (females, immigrants, blacks, etc.) can't get ahead these days
B. Disadvantaged people who can't get ahead are mostly responsible for their own condition
A. Business corporations make too much profit
B. Most corporations make a fair and reasonable amount of profit
A. Too much power is concentrated in the hands of a few large companies
B. The largest companies do NOT have too much power
A. A claim or argument should be rejected only on the basis of the substance of the argument itself.
B. A claim or argument should be rejected based on what we know about the views of the author or the person presenting the argument.
C. A claim or argument should be rejected based on what we know about the views of the author or the person presenting the argument as well as the substance of the argument.
A. Rise in income inequality over the last few decades has significant socioeconomic consequences and requires serious attention.
B. Focus on the rise in income inequality as a socioeconomic concern is wrongheaded. What matters is poverty, not income inequality.
A. It is NOT necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values
B. It is necessary to believe in God in order to be moral and have good values

Note: For each pair, participants were asked to pick the option that comes closest to their view.

Table A10: Construction of expert indicator

Statement	Reported area(s) of research (based on JEL classification) considered related to the topic
1	International Economics; Public Economics
2	Microeconomics; Economic Development; Law and Economics
3	Mathematical and Quantitative Methods (Includes behavioral topics)
4	Economic Development; Health, Education, and Welfare
5	Labour Economics; History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
6	History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
7	Given the broadness of the topic disused, no Area was identified as relevant
8	Microeconomics; Economic Development; Law and Economics; Heterodox Approaches; Public Economics
9	Microeconomics; Law and Economics
10	Macroeconomics; Health, Education, and Welfare
11	History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches; Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
12	Macroeconomics; History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches;
13	Given the broadness of the topic disused, no Area was identified as relevant
14	Microeconomics; Financial Economics
15	Economic Sociology, Economic Anthropology

Table A11: OLS Estimates of differences in agreement level between control and treatment groups – Clustered standard errors at the individual level

In Units of Standard Deviation	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treatment 1 (none-/less-mainstream source)	-0.223***	-0.220***	-0.262***	-0.268***
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Treatment 2 (no source)	-0.350***	-0.341***	-0.406***	†
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.0244)	
P-value: Treatment 1 = Treatment 2	0.000	0.000	0.000	NA
Controls	No	Yes	No	No
More Control	No	No	Yes	No
Fixed Person Effects	No	No	No	Yes
Number of observations	36375	36375	36375	25185

Note: Omitted category is receiving a mainstream source. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the individual level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is agreement level on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). For panel (B), the dependent variable is standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation of one. The average agreement level in our sample is 3.35 with standard deviation of 1.185. Significance levels: *** < 1%, ** < 5%, * < 10%.

Controls include: gender, PhD completion cohort, current status, country, and research area. More Controls include all the previously listed variables as well as age cohort, country/region of birth, English proficiency, department of affiliation, and country where PhD was completed.

† We cannot identify the effect of treatment 2 in models with individual fixed effects since those who are sorted into treatment 2 receive all statements without a source and therefore there is no variation in treatment within a person and across statements. We therefore exclude these participants from the fixed effects model.