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Old wine in new bottles? Reassessing the effects of globalisation on political preferences in Western Europe

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Abstract. In both public and scholarly debates, globalisation has recently been accredited with a massive impact on the political preferences and electoral behaviour of Western citizens. Some go as far as to declare a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, driven, for example, by individuals' exposure to international competition and their degree of national as opposed to cosmopolitan identification. Extant tests of this argument have, however, relied on class and education as proxies for these processes. In contrast, this study provides a direct test of the influence of the globalisation processes on attitudes to economic distribution, the European Union and immigration as well as on vote choice across nine West European countries. The results show that variables tapping the core aspects of globalisation have relatively little impact on attitudes and vote choice; are largely unable to account for the effects of class and education; and do not seem to lead to the establishment of new divisions between winners and losers within or across classes. Rather, the winners and losers of globalisation seem to be the traditional winners and losers with respect to material positions and political influence in modern Western societies – that is, those placed higher as opposed to lower in the class and education hierarchies. In this way, the proposed cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation may seem to be rather much like old wine in new bottles.

Keywords: cleavage; globalisation; class; education; voting

Introduction

Globalisation is in many ways *the* buzzword of the twenty-first century and is often hailed or blamed for cultural, economic and political changes all over the world. In the political sphere, globalisation is also considered to have an important impact on the political preferences and electoral behaviour of Western citizens (e.g., Hellwig & Samuels 2007; Owen & Quinn 2014). Some go as far as to declare a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, on par with or even replacing the old cleavages related to class or religion. Recent electoral events in the West seem to support this picture. Both Donald Trump's victory in the American presidential election in 2016 and the Brexit vote have been seen in this light just as globalisation played a role in the debate leading up to the 2017 presidential elections in France. Free trade, immigration and globalisation surely have been high on the agenda in the West recently.

In this article, we first present the innovative and much-cited argument made by Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008, 2012) that there is in the twenty-first century a new cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation, taking over from important cleavages of the twentieth century. Second, we argue that there have been important flaws in former empirical tests of this argument. In particular, it is unclear whether the development is really driven by

the purported globalisation processes – or if we are, instead, experiencing a revival and/or strengthening of well-known individual-level processes related to class and education. To ameliorate these flaws we identify and use variables that directly tap the characteristics of the winners and losers as defined by Kriesi et al. We bring to bear, thus, measures of exposure to globalisation as well as cosmopolitanism versus national identity. Thereby, we enable a focused test of the argument that it is these defining characteristics that drive voter reactions to globalisation. Additionally, we extend the range of countries analysed from the six covered by Kriesi et al. (i.e., Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) to include the three Scandinavian countries which, with their small and open economies, should be even more affected by globalisation.

Our tests of observable implications of the globalisation argument demonstrate that in Western Europe, variables tapping core aspects of globalisation as defined by Kriesi et al. are largely unable to account for the effects of class and education just as they do not seem to lead to the establishment of new divisions between winners and losers within classes. Rather, the winners and losers of globalisation seem, to a very considerable degree, to be the traditional winners and losers with respect to material positions and political influence in modern Western societies – that is, those placed higher as opposed to lower in the class and education hierarchies. In this way, the proposed cleavage between winners and losers of globalisation may seem to be rather much like old wine in new bottles.

Globalisation: A new cleavage?

In a series of carefully developed and analytically comprehensive works Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008, 2012) argue that there is a new *globalisation cleavage* structuring political conflict in Western Europe. The cleavage was induced by economic, cultural and political globalisation processes that benefited some segments of society and put others at a disadvantage (Kriesi et al. 2006: 922). Specifically, the globalisation model posits three interrelated processes creating groups of winners and losers. Economically, first, increased competition creates losers among those who work in previously sheltered – private – sectors that now become open to international competition. This group cuts across traditional class distinctions. Second, Kriesi et al. (2008: 5) emphasise that an essential criterion for distinguishing losers and winners is whether someone possesses exit options or not. This is tightly connected to levels of marketable skills (Kriesi et al. 2008: 7). Culturally, third, increased immigration of people from ethnically diverse origins into Western Europe creates a threat to cultural mores, perceptions and traditions of some members of the majority populations. Likewise, increased European Union integration creates a threat to those strongly identified with their nation-state – they become losers (Kriesi et al. 2008: 6–8).

At all three levels, those who have the opposite configuration can be considered winners. In short, the winners are seen to be

> entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as all cosmopolitan citizens. Losers of globalization, by contrast, include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community. (Kriesi et al. 2008: 8)

In addition to their national identity, thus, globalisation losers and winners are, in the parlance of political economy, defined based both on their factor endowments (class and education) as in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson models and their sector (i.e., how open it is to international competition) as in the Ricardo-Viner model (cf. Walter & Maduz 2009). The authors predict that, relative to the winners, losers of globalisation will be more in favour of redistribution, as this to some extent protects them against the negative economic impact of globalisation. They further predict that losers will be more against the EU (which they consider to be the prime symbol of political globalisation for Europeans) and more against immigration – all relative to winners of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2012: 12–16). Moreover, winners and losers are expected to vote in accordance with their attitudes (i.e., for parties articulating programmes appealing to their preferences). In particular, globalisation losers are expected to vote for populist right parties (Kriesi et al. 2008: 18–19).

While the work of Kriesi and his colleagues is theoretically innovative and highly stimulating, on closer inspection the empirical tests turn out to be somewhat problematic. In spite of the relatively clear identification of the theoretical mechanisms, the authors later state that 'social class as well as the level of education are the most important features distinguishing between winners and losers of globalization' (Kriesi et al. 2008: 61). Class and education are therefore used as measures of voters' positions in relation to the proposed new cleavage – as *proxies* for the variables discussed above. The argument for this approach is, in short, that people in higher classes or with higher education have 'specialized skills which are marketable inside and across the national boundaries, thus considerably increasing one's exit options' (Kriesi et al. 2008: 7).

In the empirical test, then, a position in the globalisation cleavage depends on an individual's factor endowments alone: The losers are people with low education and in 'lower' classes, while people with high education and in 'higher' social classes are the winners. For the countries included in the analysis, this amounts, essentially, to a test of the Heckscher-Ohlin or Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which predicts that globalisation benefits those owning factors of production with which their economy is relatively well endowed (i.e., those with high skill levels in advanced economies), while hurting those owning scarcer factors (i.e., lower skills; see Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006: 470).

Although understandable for both theoretical (class and education are likely related to the core variables) and practical (i.e., data availability) reasons, this analytical approach is unfortunate. It prevents an assessment of the core theoretical elements of the globalisation explanation. First, the empirical strategy does not allow us to distinguish between processes that are actually related to globalisation, and processes that are related to the old and well-known cleavages over class and education. While the class schema Kriesi et al. use (a modified version of Daniel Oesch's (2006) class schema) is likely to be somewhat correlated with exposure to international competition, it is far from a direct measure of it. Second, while both class and education may be correlated with national identity to some degree, they are not direct measures of cosmopolitanism versus national identity (we substantiate these points below). Third, although education and class are correlated with marketable skills, they are again not direct measures. Further, skills are also a core aspect of traditional conceptions of class and education (e.g., Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992; Oesch 2006; see also Atkinson 2015; Braun & Müller 1997). Using a class schema to measure skills makes it impossible, therefore,

to isolate that part of the effect of class that is unique to the globalisation model from that which is due to what is traditionally seen to be the effects of class and education.

Consequently, the otherwise impressive evidence amassed by Kriesi et al. to support their conclusion only seems to provide indirect support for the existence of a globalisation cleavage as something qualitatively different from cleavages over class and education. Specifically, Kriesi and co-authors find that the unskilled workers are more economically left-wing, more anti-EU and more anti-immigration than sociocultural specialists; they find the same for those with lower education compared to those with higher (Kriesi et al. 2008: Chapter 10). While we do not dispute these results – indeed we replicate them below – what we question is their implications with respect to the globalisation cleavage hypothesis. The results would seem to also accord with those of other analyses[1] conducted from more traditional perspectives focused on the influence of class and education rather than globalisation. In such accounts, the central mechanisms generating conflict between the groups are related to, for class, re-distribution of wealth, income and job security (cf., e.g., Lipset 1991: 208; Evans & De Graaf 2013: viii) and, for education, conflicting values grounded in, among other factors, different socialisation experiences (cf., e.g., Lipset 1981; Stubager 2008, see also Hainmueller & Hiscox 2006).

Second, as noted, the empirical strategy essentially reflects a factor-endowments model (see, e.g., Stolper & Samuelson 1941; Findlay & Kierzkowski 1983), which predicts a class-based distributional conflict where high-skilled individuals are winners of globalisation, whereas the low-skilled are losers (see Walter 2010: 410). This is in contrast to the theoretical argument that also includes a (Ricardo-Viner type) sectoral component: whether one is sheltered from international competition or not (see also Frieden & Rogowski 1996; Hays et al. 2005). In this way, the lack of empirical clarity spills over to the theoretical level in the sense that it becomes unclear who the winners and losers of globalisation *really* are.

To put it pointedly, the analyses of Kriesi et al. seek to demonstrate the relevance of the alleged, new globalisation cleavage against the traditional conflicts over class and education by using standard measures of the latter to represent the former and without taking into account the sectoral element of the purported new mechanism and its conditioning effects. With the extant set of analyses from Kriesi and his co-authors it is, therefore, not clear that the hypothesis regarding a new cleavage is supported: the results could just as easily be interpreted as indicating the continued – maybe even renewed – influence of class and education and the processes associated with them. In essence, thus, while we agree with Kriesi et al. that class and education are important predictors of political behaviour in modern Western societies, we question whether this relationship reflects the processes suggested by the authors.

Testing the globalisation model

To approach a better understanding of the processes at work, we aspire to subject the model of political behaviour that Kriesi et al. develop (henceforth the 'globalisation model') to a more valid test. We do this by testing two observable implications pertaining to the core processes of the globalisation model. First, we focus on the influence of the economic aspect of globalisation: increased international competition. As noted, Kriesi et al. see such competition as a key aspect of the globalisation model and suggest that those exposed

to it (i.e., the losers of globalisation) will react politically as described above. If class and education are proxies for such experiences, it means that a direct measure hereof should account for a considerable part of the effect of class and education on attitudes and vote choice. This also applies for individuals' degree of national identity. Those who are strongly attached to their nation-state are seen as losers of the globalisation process that dissolves the boundaries between such states. To the extent that class and education are proxies for such identities as is assumed in the modelling of Kriesi et al., we should – like for exposure to international competition – find that including a direct identity measure will reduce the effect of class and education on the attitude and party choice variables. Our first hypothesis, then, is that direct measures of exposure to international competition as well as strength of national identity should account for a considerable part of the effect of class and education on attitudes and party preference (*H1*).

Second, according to Kriesi et al. (2008: 6), the increased international competition affects individuals across traditional class boundaries resulting in 'cross-class coalitions'. This implies that we should see an interaction between individuals' class location and their exposure to international competition such that class differences diminish or disappear among those negatively affected by globalisation. This is *H2*.

However, and related to the point regarding the lack of theoretical clarity of the globalisation model, the effects may be more nuanced. Thus, based on work in trade theory and combining a sectoral and factoral approach Walter and Maduz (2009; see also Walter 2017) argue that the losers of globalisation are those low-ability individuals who are exposed to international competition, because they are most at risk of losing their job and receiving low wages. Conversely, highly productive individuals who are exposed to international competition receive higher wages and can be characterised as globalisation winners. In-between these two extremes, low-ability workers in sectors that are sheltered from international competition are better off than their counterparts in the exposed industries, but are worse off than the high-ability employees in the sheltered industries. According to this view, exposure to international competition has different effects for members of different classes.

Evidence of such a heterogeneous effect of globalisation on political behaviour has been found for preferences regarding the welfare state (Walter 2010), income inequality (Walter 2017) and immigration policy (Dancygier & Walter 2015) as well as for party choice (Rommel & Walter 2018). Following this logic, we should, as for *H2*, expect to find an interaction between individuals' class location and their exposure to international completion. But contrary to *H2* we would expect the lower classes to react negatively towards globalisation when exposed to it, while the higher classes react positively when exposed to globalisation. To provide a more encompassing test of the mechanisms associated with globalisation, we test this argument as *H3*.

We examine these implications with respect to two elements both seen as central to the cleavage model of politics: political attitudes and party preference. Thus, we examine, first, the extent to which the implications are supported with respect to economic left-right, EU and immigration attitudes. These are the three kinds of political attitudes that globalisation should be particularly relevant for, according to Kriesi et al. (2008: 5–8). Second, we investigate the degree of support for the expectations with respect to party preference, which has been the central way of measuring cleavages for decades.

We should underline that we do not purport to investigate all possible implications of the globalisation model, neither as laid out by Kriesi and colleagues, nor in the political economy literature. But we do look into a set of relevant processes that seem to follow directly from the core argument of Kriesi et al. The analyses will, consequently, provide a first indication of the tenability of the globalisation model as compared to more traditional class- and education-based oppositions.

Data and methodology

To test our hypotheses, we use the latest version of the European Values Study (EVS 2008) at the time of writing (i.e., from 2008 to 2010). As the only cross-national dataset, the EVS contains the variables required to test the various models: (1) Several nuanced measures of economic left-right, EU and immigration attitudes in addition to party preference; and (2) information necessary for constructing our independent and control variables. In total, we bring to bear evidence based on 8,084 respondents from nine countries.[2]

The countries were chosen based on two considerations. First, the use of the six original cases permits a replication of the analyses of Kriesi and his co-authors just as it holds constant country-specific factors that might otherwise confound the analyses. Second, the inclusion of the three Scandinavian countries extends the test of the arguments to a set of cases for which the mechanisms underlying the globalisation hypothesis should be particularly strong. Given their small, open economies, the Scandinavian countries are highly susceptible to the influence of international competition. They may, therefore, be seen as critical cases for the globalisation hypothesis – that is, as cases in which globalisation should a have particularly strong impact.

The independent variables

We start out with the variables used by Kriesi et al.: class and education. The former is measured by a standard six-class version of the traditional EGP occupational class measure (Erikson et al. 1979; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992: Chapter 2). In our model, we operate with the following classes: unskilled workers, skilled workers, routine non-manual employees, petite bourgeoisie, and the lower and higher service class.[3] Second, like Kriesi et al. (2008: 64), we use a standard education variable with three groups: 'lower' (pre-primary, primary or lower secondary education), 'medium' (upper or post-secondary education) and 'higher' (first or second stage of tertiary education).

To conduct a more direct test of the globalisation model, we use measures focusing on the processes through which globalisation is argued to affect people's life situation. The first is exposure to globalisation. This is traditionally measured in three different ways in the political economy literature: whether the sector an individual works in is tradable or non-tradable (e.g., Hays et al. 2005); the degree to which the sector is exposed to foreign direct investment (e.g., Scheve & Slaughter 2004); and the degree to which an individual's occupation is offshorable. Offshoring – the movement of employment from one country to another – is an aspect of globalisation that has accelerated rapidly over the last decades (Rommel & Walter 2018) and it is the measure that we focus on in the main analyses below.

We do so for two reasons. First, it has been argued forcefully that political preferences are 'shaped much more' (Walter 2017: 63) by occupational risks than by sectoral risks, as it is easier for an individual to change his or her sector of employment than to change occupation (Iversen & Soskice 2001; Cusack et al. 2006; Rehm 2009). The measure is expected, therefore, to capture the pressure of globalisation felt by individuals much better than sectoral measures. Second, it allows us to use the nuanced measures of the dependent variables in the EVS, which contains occupational data on the respondents, but unfortunately, no data on the industrial sectors in which they are employed.

However, because this is an important point in the theoretical discussion and to make sure that this choice does not affect our results, we have replicated the entire set of analyses as closely as possible, using the first two waves of the European Social Survey (ESS 2002, 2004). While not all measures used below are available in the ESS, it allows us to include a measure of whether the individual is working in a tradeable or sheltered sector, in addition to the offshorability of their jobs. These analyses of a different dataset show the same overall results as do the EVS data and we have, for this reason and due to space restrictions, placed them in the Online Appendix.[4]

Following recent work in the political economy field (e.g., Dancygier & Walter 2015; Walter 2017; Rommel & Walter 2018) we use Blinder's (2009) offshorability index to assess the extent to which a person's job is offshorable. Clearly, the more easily your job can be offshored, the more exposed you are to international competition. The index is based on International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) codes of respondents' jobs. It 'measures whether the service the job provides can theoretically be delivered over long distances with little or no degradation in quality' (Dancygier & Walter 2015: 137). The index ranges between 0 and 100, where a low value indicates that the job is hard or impossible to move out of the country and a high value indicates that the job is easily offshorable. For example, childcare has a value of zero because it requires close physical contact, while data entry keyers perform activities that are clearly offshorable and are thus assigned a value of 100 (Blinder 2009: 51–52). We transform the index to 0–10 for ease of interpretation (see the Online Appendix for descriptive statistics for all variables).[5]

Second, we measure people's degree of identification with their national community as opposed to a more cosmopolitan identity. To construct this variable, we rely on a question where respondents were asked which geographical group they 'first and foremost' belong to, and then which they 'secondly' belong to. They could choose between their town/local area, region, country, Europe and the world. Respondents who place their country first, and their local or regional belonging second, or the other way around, are considered to possess a primarily national identity. Respondents who place Europe or the world first, are cosmopolitans. Respondents who either place their country, local area or region first, and Europe or the world second, are considered to be in an intermediate position.[6] This measure is used to test the part of the first hypothesis related to national identity versus cosmopolitan orientations. In all models, we control for age, gender and urban-rural residence.

The dependent variables

Party preference is operationalised through a question of vote intention in the EVS. Like Kriesi et al. (2012), we distinguish between seven party families: Communists/Left Socialists,

Social Democrats, Greens, Liberals, Christian Democrats and Conservatives, the Populist Right, and other parties (including EU protest parties). We follow Kriesi et al.'s (2012: 52–53) categorisation of the various parties for the six original countries, and extend the it to the three Scandinavian countries (see the Online Appendix for a complete overview).

Economic left-right attitudes are measured by asking for the respondent's views on individual versus state responsibility, economic freedom, income inequality versus incentives, private versus public incentives, and competition. Following the work of Knutsen (2018) and Langsæther (2019), responses to these five items are combined into an index of economic left-right attitudes ranging from 0 to 10. Higher values on the index indicate left-wing positions (see the Online Appendix for details on the scale construction).

EU attitudes are measured by respondents' responses to a number of items about fears they might have about the EU membership, like loss of social security, power, jobs and national identity/culture, as well as growth in EU expenses for their own country. Responses to these items are combined and rescaled to the 0–10 range with higher values indicating more fear of the EU.[7]

Finally, for immigration attitudes we again use an index developed by Knutsen (2018). The index is based on questions related to how the respondent feels about immigration and immigrants: are they seen as a cultural threat, should they maintain or abandon their customs and traditions, are they a strain on the welfare system or not and so on. The summated scale goes from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating more positive immigration attitudes. The multiple indicators used here represent an important improvement on extant research on globalisation and political preferences (e.g., Dancygier & Walter 2015) which has mainly relied on single indicators.

Methodology and models

To assess our research question about the implication of globalisation processes for cleavage development in Western Europe we run four (ordinary least squares (OLS) or multinomial logistic) regression models for each dependent variable. In the first model, we include class and education in addition to the control variables.[8] The model, thus, can be seen as a baseline one intended to replicate the analyses of Kriesi et al. Our second model contains only the controls and the measures of offshorability and national identity in order to establish the existence of a relationship between the two globalisation variables and the outcomes as a preliminary step before estimating the third model which combines class and education with the two globalisation variables. By comparing results from this model with those from the first model containing only class and education (and the controls) we can, in our third model, evaluate *H1*, which suggest that the effects of class and education is reduced when the variables are included in the same model as offshorability and national identity. Finally, in the fourth model, we interact the offshorability and class measures to test *H2* and *H3* about the existence of an interaction effect between class and exposure to international competition.

All models are run on a pooled dataset comprising all observations. In addition, all the analyses of political attitudes are run in each of the nine countries individually. In the discussion below, the focus will be on the former, although we will also comment on the country-specific results (which are presented in the Online Appendix). In the pooled models

Table 1. Explaining economic left-right attitudes. Ordinary least squares (OLS)

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class:Hi.serv.	−0.78*** (0.07)		−0.74*** (0.07)	−0.74*** (0.09)
Class:Lo.serv.	−0.44*** (0.07)		−0.40*** (0.07)	−0.32*** (0.08)
Class:Rout.nman	−0.19** (0.06)		−0.17** (0.06)	−0.14* (0.07)
Class:Petite bourg.	−0.99*** (0.09)		−0.94*** (0.09)	−0.93*** (0.13)
Class:Skilled workers	−0.06 (0.07)		−0.04 (0.07)	−0.10 (0.08)
Education:Medium	−0.18*** (0.05)		−0.17** (0.05)	−0.17** (0.05)
Education:Higher	−0.13* (0.06)		−0.15* (0.06)	−0.15* (0.06)
Nat.ID:Intermediate		0.01 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)
Nat.ID:Cosmopolitan		0.22*** (0.06)	0.25*** (0.06)	0.26*** (0.06)
Offshorability		−0.04*** (0.01)	−0.02*** (0.01)	−0.01 (0.02)
Hi.serv. × Offshorability				−0.01 (0.02)
Lo.serv. × Offshorability				−0.03 (0.02)
Rout.nman × Offshorability				−0.02 (0.02)
Petite bourg. × Offshorability				−0.01 (0.03)
Skilled w. × Offshorability				0.03 (0.03)
Controls and constant	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R^2	0.082	0.052	0.086	0.087

Notes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$. N = 8,084. Reference categories: Class: Unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: Lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

we include country fixed effects to account for any country-specific variation not captured by our independent variables.

Results

Before launching into the main analyses, it is worth noting that there is only a weak relationship between the two sets of independent variables in our analysis. Thus, as can be seen in Table A.1.7 in the Online Appendix, there are only small differences with respect to offshoreability between the classes and educational groups. The same applies for cosmopolitanism, although it is moderately related to education. These results substantiate our critique of Kriesi et al.'s use of class and education as proxies for the globalisation processes just as they raise initial doubts about *H1*. If there is only a weak-to-moderate relationship between class and education and the globalisation variables, it seems less likely that the latter mediate the effect of the former on our dependent variables. The discussion below, ordered according to the dependent variables, throws light on exactly this.

Economic left-right attitudes

Table 1 shows the results of the pooled OLS regression analysis of economic left-right attitudes. In model 1 we see clear differences between both groups of workers and all

the other classes, with the largest differences opening up between workers and the higher service class and the petite bourgeoisie – exactly as a traditional class approach would predict. Furthermore, class seems to be a much stronger predictor of left-right attitudes than education – again a result that comports with traditional models.

Model 2 shows that the globalisation variables are also related to economic attitudes. But for both variables we find the opposite result of what the globalisation model predicts: those exposed to offshorability and with a strong national identity (i.e., the losers of globalisation) are the most fiscally right-wing.

Combining the globalisation variables with class and education in model 3 permits a test of *H1*, which argues that the effects of class and education will be substantially reduced – maybe even disappear – when placed alongside variables tapping into the globalisation process. As is evident from the table, the effects of class and education are almost unchanged between models 1 and 3. This means that the hypothesis will have to be rejected.[9,10]

The same applies to *H2* and *H3*, which are tested in model 4. All of the individual interaction terms as well as all of them together ($F = 1.5, p = 0.19$) are insignificant just as the increase in the adjusted R^2 is marginal (0.001). We see no sign of globalisation-based cross-class alliances forming: Class differences are not smaller among those exposed to globalisation than among those not so exposed (*H2*). Furthermore, people in higher classes do not become more right-wing when exposed to globalisation, and people in lower classes do not become more left-wing (*H3*). We should note, however, that when interacting education, rather than class, with offshorability there is one statistically significant interaction term: Those with the highest level of education are somewhat more right-wing when exposed to globalisation compared to those not so exposed.[11] This counts against *H2*, which therefore has to be rejected, but the result provides some support for *H3* (cf. Walter 2010, 2017) – a point to which we will return in the conclusion.

We have also tested the hypotheses in each country individually (see the Online Appendix). In eight out of the nine countries, there is no support for *H1*: The class and education coefficients do not change substantially after introducing controls for the globalisation variables. Only in Denmark is a small change detectable for two classes. There is also no support for *H2* or *H3* in eight out of the nine countries with only minor effects showing up for a few class categories in France. Furthermore, the variables used to directly tap the globalisation processes fare no better in the Scandinavian countries than in the other six, despite the open economies of the former. While the globalisation variables on average explain 4 per cent of the variance in economic left-right attitudes in the original six countries, they explain on average 5 per cent in the Scandinavian countries.

As far as regards economic left-right attitudes, our tests have not been encouraging for the globalisation perspective. While class and education are related to the attitudes in the expected way, this association does not seem to be driven by the globalisation processes. Rather, the relationship conforms to what traditional models would predict. There is no evidence of cross-class alliances and no evidence of classes reacting differentially to globalisation.

Table 2. Explaining EU attitudes. Ordinary least squares (OLS)

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class:Hi.serv.	−0.85*** (0.12)		−0.74*** (0.12)	−0.74*** (0.14)
Class:Lo.serv.	−0.65*** (0.11)		−0.52*** (0.11)	−0.58*** (0.13)
Class:Rout.nman	−0.34** (0.11)		−0.28** (0.11)	−0.34** (0.12)
Class:Petite bourg.	−0.64*** (0.15)		−0.59*** (0.15)	−0.65** (0.20)
Class:Skilled workers	0.10 (0.13)		0.07 (0.12)	0.04 (0.14)
Education:Medium	−0.35*** (0.09)		−0.37*** (0.09)	−0.38*** (0.09)
Education:Higher	−1.41*** (0.10)		−1.32*** (0.10)	−1.32*** (0.10)
Nat.ID:Intermediate		−0.95*** (0.08)	−0.75*** (0.08)	−0.75*** (0.08)
Nat.ID:Cosmopolitan		−1.57*** (0.09)	−1.38*** (0.09)	−1.38*** (0.09)
Offshorability		−0.05*** (0.01)	−0.02* (0.01)	−0.05 (0.03)
Hi.serv. × Offshorability				0.01 (0.04)
Lo.serv. × Offshorability				0.04 (0.04)
Rout.nman × Offshorability				0.04 (0.04)
Petite bourg. × Offshorability				0.04 (0.05)
Skilled w. × Offshorability				0.03 (0.04)
Controls and constant	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R^2	0.149	0.126	0.188	0.188

Notes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$. N = 6,935. Reference categories: Class: Unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: Lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

EU attitudes

Turning to the analysis of EU attitudes in Table 2, we see a rather similar picture. Both class and education (the latter more strongly so than in Table 1) are related to EU attitudes in the expected direction – that is, those with higher levels of education or placed higher up in the class hierarchy are more sympathetic to the EU. Unsurprisingly, model 2 shows that whether individuals identify with their nation or have a more cosmopolitan self-conception is rather strongly related to their EU attitudes with cosmopolitans more positively disposed. Somewhat more surprisingly, however, those occupied in jobs exposed to international competition are more positive towards the EU than those not so exposed. Combining the globalisation variables with class and education in model 3 only affects the influence of the latter minimally and all coefficients that were significant in model 1 remain so in model 3. This again leads to a rejection of *H1*. Turning to model 4, finally, we can see that *H2* and *H3* will also have to be rejected since none of the interaction terms are significant just as the overall test comes out insignificant ($F = 0.2, p = 0.96$).[12]

At the country level, the class and education coefficients change only marginally or not at all when controlling for the globalisation variables, thereby contradicting *H1*. As for *H2* and *H3*, the formal, joint tests of the interaction coefficients all turn out insignificant meaning that we have to reject these hypotheses. Furthermore, the globalisation variables explain

Table 3. Explaining immigration attitudes. Ordinary least squares (OLS)

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class:Hi.serv.	0.44*** (0.10)		0.36*** (0.09)	0.31** (0.11)
Class:Lo.serv.	0.45*** (0.09)		0.36*** (0.09)	0.45*** (0.10)
Class:Rout.nman	0.24** (0.09)		0.20* (0.08)	0.21* (0.09)
Class:Petite bourg.	0.01 (0.11)		−0.01 (0.11)	−0.03 (0.15)
Class:Skilled workers	−0.21* (0.10)		−0.18 (0.10)	−0.21 (0.11)
Education:Medium	0.28*** (0.07)		0.30*** (0.07)	0.30*** (0.07)
Education:Higher	1.09*** (0.08)		1.01*** (0.07)	1.00*** (0.07)
Nat.ID:Intermediate		0.79*** (0.06)	0.66*** (0.06)	0.66*** (0.06)
Nat.ID:Cosmopolitan		1.45*** (0.07)	1.32*** (0.07)	1.32*** (0.07)
Offshorability		0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)
Hi.serv. × Offshorability				0.02 (0.03)
Lo.serv. × Offshorability				−0.03 (0.03)
Rout.nman × Offshorability				−0.00 (0.03)
Petite bourg. × Offshorability				0.00 (0.04)
Skilled w. × Offshorability				0.01 (0.04)
Controls and constant	x	x	x	x
Adjusted R^2	0.150	0.150	0.199	0.199

Notes: $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{***}p < 0.001$. N = 8,084. Reference categories: Class: Unskilled workers; Nat. ID: Strong national identity; Education: Lower. Standard errors in parentheses.

on average 9 per cent of the variation in the six original countries, and only 6 per cent in the Scandinavian countries. For EU attitudes, thus, these variables fare worst where the globalisation model would have expected them to do best.

In sum and as was the case for left-right economic attitudes, the globalisation variables seem unable to account for the effects of class and education on EU attitudes. These effects do not appear driven by the processes suggested by Kriesi and co-authors; processes that seem, however, to also have some effect on individuals' EU attitudes independently of class and education.

Immigration attitudes

As can be seen in Table 3, we generally find the same pattern of results with respect to immigration attitudes. Again, we note from model 1 the well-known connections between class, education and immigration attitudes. As expected by the globalisation model, the estimates from model 2 show those with a cosmopolitan identity to be the most positive towards immigration, but – contrary to expectations based on the model – that also applies to those most subject to international competition. This effect, however, becomes insignificant in model 3 when placed alongside class and education. And as was the case for the two other attitudinal variables, the effects of the two latter variables are left mainly unaffected

by the inclusion of the globalisation variables. Again, this leads us to reject *H1*: the effects of class and education are not accounted for by the globalisation processes. Model 4, finally, indicates that we also have to reject *H2* and *H3*. Neither the individual coefficients nor all of them together ($F = 0.76, p = 0.58$) are significant. There is thus no sign of cross-class alliances between the losers of globalisation; nor is there any sign that those with lower skills react negatively to exposure while those with higher skills react positively.

The country-specific analyses support this picture. First, we find no support for *H1* in six out of nine countries, while only smaller changes in the class (the United Kingdom) and education coefficients (Austria and France) can be observed after controlling for the globalisation variables in the three remaining countries. *H2* and *H3* do not receive any support in eight of the countries, neither as judged by individual coefficients nor joint tests. And while the joint test comes out significant in France, the individual coefficients show an incoherent pattern. Finally, and again in contrast to the globalisation perspective, the globalisation variables account for 13 per cent of the variation in the six original countries and only 7 per cent on average in the open economies of Scandinavia.

Summing up, therefore, we can conclude that the globalisation model fails to meet the expectations based on the observable implications derived from it, also for immigration attitudes. While at least one of the variables used to directly tap its effects is significant and provide additional explanatory power (viz. the change in R^2 from models 2 to 3), they fail to account for the effects of class and education just as we do not find an interaction between class and exposure to international competition.

Party preference

To estimate the effects of the independent variables on party preference, we rely on multinomial logistic regressions. The individual coefficients are of less interest and are, therefore, presented in the Online Appendix. Instead, we focus mainly on the overall significance and effects of the core independent variables presented in Table 4.

Table 4. Overall significance of variables and goodness-of-fit for the multinomial logit models of party preference

	1 Class and education	2 Globalisation variables	3 Combined model	4 Interaction model
Class	175.28***		154.48***	101.70***
Education	116.98***		103.08***	101.86***
National ID		142.95***	117.70***	118.90***
Offshorability		49.78***	23.26***	6.00
Class × Offshorability				37.28
McFadden's R^2	0.126	0.115	0.133	0.135
AIC	19452.507	19653.843	19326.059	19344.385
BIC	20216.990	20257.382	20211.250	20430.756

Note: The Wald tests show the Chi^2 value for the Wald test. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.



Figure 1. Effects of the variables on party preference. Absolute kappa scores.
Notes: The two first bars show the absolute kappa value for class and education from model 1. The next four bars show the kappa values for class, education, cosmopolitanism and offshorability, calculated based on model 3. All kappa values are shown with 95 per cent simulated confidence intervals. For offshorability, the calculation is based on a version of the variable with four levels of offshorability.
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]

The short version of the results is that we replicate the pattern from the three previous tables. First, it is clear from model 1 that both class and education affect party preference. Moving on to model 2, we can see that the two globalisation variables also have significant effects on party choice. The crucial test of *H1* is based on model 3, where we note that the inclusion of the globalisation variables does not cause the overall effects of education and class to become insignificant. From the table we cannot see, though, whether the size of the effects of the two latter variables is affected by the inclusion of the globalisation variables. We return to this matter below after observing from model 4 that *H2* and *H3* have to be rejected since the interaction between class and offshorability turns out to be insignificant. Likewise, including the interaction does not improve the pseudo-R^2, the AIC or the BIC. As is the case for the three attitudinal variables, we do not, in other words, find evidence of cross-class, globalisation-driven coalitions when it comes to party choice. Nor do we find evidence that people in lower classes react differently from people in higher classes when exposed to globalisation.

Returning to the test of *H1*, we rely on the value of the so-called 'absolute kappa' to conduct a more direct test of the mediation argument entailed in the hypothesis. The kappa index is broadly defined as the group differences in party preference (see Hout et al. 1995) and is commonly applied in studies of cleavage voting (e.g., Brooks et al. 2006; Jansen 2011; Langsæther 2017). Higher kappa values indicate higher levels of cleavage voting. We have used Lachat's (2007) *cindex* program to estimate the absolute kappa index for each categorical variable, as well as simulated 95 per cent confidence intervals. The kappa values for the variables included in models 1 and 3 appear in Figure 1.

The figure shows a very clear pattern. As can be seen by comparing, respectively, the first and third and the second and fourth bars, the effects of class and education on vote choice are left substantially unchanged from model 1 to model 3. Thus, as is the case for (at least two of) the three attitudinal variables, the two globalisation variables have significant effects on the vote (see also the fifth and sixth bars), but these effects do not detract from those of class and education. Consequently, we have to reject *H1*.

We should note that the conclusions with respect to party choice in general also apply to populist right parties in particular.[13] Hence, our rejection of the globalisation processes as explanations for the effects of class and education also apply for the party family identified by Kriesi and co-authors as the primary choice of globalisation losers. All in all, the results for party preference resemble those from the analyses of the attitude dimensions and do not, therefore, provide the expected level of support for the implications of the globalisation hypothesis. The effects of class and education on the vote do not, in other words, seem to reflect the globalisation processes, although the latter seem to have some measure of independent influence.[14]

Conclusion and discussion

The core claim of the globalisation hypothesis advanced by Kriesi and his co-authors is that a new polarisation of the 'winners' and 'losers' of globalisation has taken over from older cleavages, not least over class. However, when testing this claim, the authors rely on variables tapping exactly such older cleavages (i.e., class and education). To remedy the lack of clarity with respect to the veracity of the mechanisms underlying the globalisation hypothesis – degree of national (as opposed to cosmopolitan) identity, vulnerability to increased international competition, and the interaction between the latter and an individual's factor endowments – we have investigated three hypotheses about the mechanisms behind the effects of class and education on political attitudes and party preference. First, that exposure to international competition as well as individuals' degree of national versus cosmopolitan identification mediate a substantial part of the effects of class and education (*H1*). Second, that exposure to international competition cuts across classes leading to cross-class alliances (*H2*). And finally, as an extension of the model proposed by Kriesi et al., that exposure to globalisation leads to differential political reactions from people in lower and higher classes (*H3*).

As the analyses above have demonstrated, the implications are not supported for any of the four, strategically selected dependent variables in our analysis: economic left-right, EU and immigration attitudes as well as party choice. Thus, including the degree of offshorability of individuals' jobs and their degree of national identification does not reduce the effects of class and education by any noteworthy amount. Contrary to the first implication of the globalisation model, hence, the effects of the two former variables are not mediated by the globalisation processes. Likewise, exposure to international competition as measured by offshorability does not seem to lead to the formation of cross-class alliances of globalisation winners and losers with similar attitudes and party choice, nor do we see a differential reaction to globalisation across classes and educational groups (except for one point discussed below). The results hold up across datasets and operationalisations, including

models comprising individuals' employment sector as in the argument (but not the test) proposed by Kriesi et al.

Overall, however, although a fair amount of their impact is shared with class and education, we do find evidence for an effect of the globalisation variables beyond that of the two traditional variables. Even if the variables are unable to account for the effects of class and education, this evidence might be an indicator of the existence of a globalisation cleavage separate from and in addition to the traditional cleavages. Four points should, however, be noted in this context. First, the effect of offshorability is, for all three attitudinal variables, the opposite of what the globalisation model leads one to expect: those most subject to international competition – that is, those most likely to lose from globalisation – are the most economically right-wing and the most positive towards both the EU and immigration. Furthermore, the variable is, according to Figure 1, the one with the weakest effect on party preference – a finding that also holds for populist right parties. Second, the effect of offshorability is insignificant when controlled for class and education in model 3 for immigration attitudes. The cosmopolitanism/national identity variable, third, has significant effects on all four outcome variables. However, on economic attitudes, those who are more strongly identified with their country – and hence losers of globalisation – have the most right-wing attitudes. This contradicts the globalisation model's expectation that losers should opt for protection in the form of left-wing economic policies. Nevertheless, the strength of this variable for the other three outcomes is interesting, and future research should look into whether the variable is best considered a structural or an attitudinal variable. That people who feel like they belong first and foremost to the world or to Europe are supporters of the EU is hardly surprising. It raises, fourth, a question as to how much can be gauged about the structural roots of political alignments on the basis of this variable.[15] In sum, therefore, while the two variables directly tapping into the globalisation processes show effects, they are often rather weak and, in many instances, run counter to expectations. We would think it appropriate, therefore, to be cautious about basing claims about a new cleavage on these variables. The same is true if we instead employ another measure of globalisation exposure: sectoral exposure to international trade.

We should also point out that we have found no systematic country-level variation in the support for our conclusions. The few differences between the results from the pooled data set and analyses in individual countries that do manifest are weak and unsystematic. In addition, the globalisation variables do not seem to fare better in the three Scandinavian cases in spite of the openness of their economies. We consider this problematic for the globalisation model which (even if imperfectly operationalised) should be expected to have a stronger influence in countries that are highly susceptible to the influences of globalisation. The same could be said in relation to the failure of the hypotheses derived from the globalisation model to hold up with respect to voting for populist right parties – parties that were singled out by Kriesi and co-authors as the primary choice of the losers of globalisation. Hence, the model also fell short of expectations for this critical case.

Across all of our models, the two traditional variables – class and education – come out as clearly significant and with fairly strong effects. As would be expected from previous research, class is more important for economic left-right attitudes and overall party choice, education for EU and immigration attitudes. In this respect, our results do not deviate from those of Kriesi et al. who use class and education as proxies for the globalisation processes.

However, when placing both their and our results for these two variables alongside our tests of a set of central implications of the globalisation model, the interpretation of the results would seem to be different from that offered by the globalisation model. The variables do not account for the effects of class and education and are, in themselves, not sufficient to sustain the claim of a new cleavage. Rather, the purported new, globalisation cleavage seems, at its core, to be a replication of the previously known conflicts over class and education.

This is in line with recent evidence from the field of political economy. Thus, Dippel et al. (2015) find no effect of globalisation exposure on voting or turnout – the only exception being a small effect on voting for German neo-Nazi parties. Similarly, Colantone and Stanig (2018) find no effect of globalisation exposure on the vote share of protectionist left or liberal right parties, but only a weak-to-moderate effect on radical right voting.

This is not to say that the processes underlying globalisation, such as increased international competition, EU-integration and migration, have no bearing on how voters behave in West European countries. Far from it, in fact. First, as opposed to constituting a full cleavage, there are local effects – for instance, occupational traits such as offshorability may affect trade preferences (e.g., Owen & Johnston 2017). Second, it follows straightforwardly from extant research on both class and education that trends related to globalisation such as those mentioned above should be expected to have political repercussions since they are likely to affect the interests and attitudes of different classes and/or educational groups in different ways, thereby creating the potential for political conflict and mobilisation.

Indeed, the otherwise surprising observation that individuals, particularly those with high levels of education, exposed to offshorability are more rather than less right-wing on economic issues may be interpreted as indicating exactly this: that globalisation processes reinvigorate classic conflicts over economic distribution. The result could reflect the fact that those exposed to globalisation in the form of international competition, the highly educated in particular, gain more from this competition than those not so exposed – that is, the processes underlying the classic Stolper and Samuelson (1941) model (cf. also Walter 2010, 2017). Alternatively, the result could reflect the fact that individuals with more rightist economic attitudes self-select into jobs characterised by international competition as a way to pursue the higher gains available in an internationally competitive industry; this would, incidentally, fit our observation (in Table A.1.7 in the Online Appendix) that those with higher levels of education or class position are more exposed to international competition.[16] Of course, these conjectures go beyond our analyses here and should be explored by future research.

In sum, our main point is not that Kriesi et al.'s idea that globalisation affects political alignments is wrong – quite the contrary. What we are arguing on the basis of the analyses presented above is that the underlying conflicts are not (at least not primarily) centred on the mechanisms identified by Kriesi and co-authors. Rather, to a considerable degree, the conflicts revolve around the oppositions between classes and educational groups identified by previous work on these factors. We would on the basis of this first, direct test of the mechanisms of the globalisation model, conclude that the proposed globalisation cleavage appears rather more like old wine in new bottles.

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Online Appendix

Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end of the article.

Notes

1. For class and left-wing attitudes, see Lipset (1981), Svallfors (2006); for class and EU attitudes, see Gabel (1998), Gabel & Palmer (1995), Hix (2005); for class, education and immigration-attitudes, see Coffé (2013), Dancygier & Walter (2015), Oesch (2008), Oskarson & Demker (2013), Stubager (2008).
2. For reasons discussed below, we furthermore replicate the results using the first two rounds of the ESS, see the Online Appendix.
3. We have also estimated all models using instead the class schema developed by Oesch (2006); the results (available from the authors upon request) are essentially the same as those reported below. This is in line with recent evidence that the two class schemas have similar explanatory power across time (Vestin & Oskarson 2017) and space (Knutsen & Langsæther 2016).
4. Likewise, we have replicated the analyses using yet another measure of globalisation exposure from Walter (2017) – namely whether the sector is import-competing or export-oriented, based on revealed comparative (dis)advantage. These analyses yield essentially the same results as those presented and are available from the authors upon request.
5. We also run all models with a dichotomous version of this variable. This does not alter any of the substantial conclusions (see the Online Appendix).
6. As a robustness check, the Online Appendix includes analyses where we instead employ a variable measuring how proud the respondent is to be a citizen of the country. The results are robust to this change.
7. These items were not asked in Norway, which is not a member of the EU. For this reason, Norway is excluded from analyses of this specific attitude dimension.
8. The tables below only show the coefficients of interests. Full data are available in Table A.7 in the Online Appendix.
9. In addition, we use the KHB method (Breen et al. 2013) to test the extent of mediation of the class and education effects by the two globalisation variables. Except for one coefficient in one model, these tests were insignificant, hence rejecting the mediation expectation. Thus, and because the one significant coefficient was only affected marginally, we conclude that the test showed no noteworthy sign of mediation.
10. Since we can also note that the effects of the globalisation variables do not change much from model 2 to model 3, while the R^2 increases, it would seem that the two sets of variables are reflecting rather separate causal processes in the formation of left-right economic attitudes – a point to which we return below.
11. The results are available from the authors upon request. We find a similar pattern in the analyses of the ESS data.
12. There is also no significant interaction between *education* and offshorability. The same applies for immigration attitudes and party choice.

13. The hypotheses can be evaluated based on the coefficients presented in the Online Appendix just as a plot similar to Figure 1, but for voting for the populist right (not shown) fails to show a reduction in the effects of class and education.
14. We have furthermore replicated all the analyses as closely as possible with the variables available in the first two rounds of the ESS, and the results corroborate our findings here. This also holds when using other measures of globalisation exposure, such as tradeability of the sector.
15. The same applies to our alternative operationalisation of the national/cosmopolitan identification variable (cf. the Online Appendix).
16. For EU and immigration attitudes, the unexpected result that offshoreability is associated with more positive attitudes (although the effect is insignificant for immigration attitudes when controlling for education and class) could reflect similar self-selection and/or the effect of exposure to international impulses (cf. the contact theory of intergroup attitudes first presented by Allport 1954).

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